

Europe of Defence one year after the Lisbon Treaty

Review and future prospects

Although the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1st December 2009, the European Union (EU) is currently floundering in an economic crisis that is jeopardizing a structure made fragile by the diversity of Europe's history and political tradition. Budget cuts take precedence.

Placed in the context of the overall changes in defence expenditure over the last ten years, the latest cutbacks reinforce the impression that Europe is denying itself the wherewithal to become a global player. Europeans seem to have reached the "end of history" predicted by philosopher Francis Fukuyama in the 1990s. Restructuration is disrupting the traditional hierarchy of power, whilst the clear emergence of new centres of power outside the western world and the general increase in defence expenditure are equally destabilising factors.

Almost a year after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, as NATO members negotiate a new "strategic concept", the coming months are the ideal time to reflect – once again – on the position and ambitions of a "Europe of defence". This note is the first in a series of publications in the framework of the Research Programme entitled "Defence & Security : the cost of a non-Europe". The note aims to incite debate on the future of NATO and Europe of defence by drawing up a status report on the evolution of defence policies of EU member states over the past few years and assessing the prospects offered by the Lisbon Treaty.



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Progress has undeniably been made since the idea of a “Europe of defence” was first introduced in 1998 at the Franco-British Saint-Malo summit. Now equipped with a rapid reaction force made up of battlegroups of 1500 men as well as with politico-military structures, it has been involved in over twenty external operations (EO), the most ambitious of which is Operation “Atalante” to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Yet ever since it was founded, the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) – which became the CSDP¹ when the Lisbon Treaty came into force – has suffered from a lack of political willingness to act. Only a few countries have shown any real desire to commit themselves to building up European defence. Moreover, as a result of the economic crisis, the issue no longer features high on the Union’s political agenda. Nor has Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, made it one of her priorities.

At a colloquium organised by the Foundation for Strategic Research (France, June 2010), Camille Grand and Nicole Gnesotto even declared that in the light of the current situation, the most likely scenario would be that “Europe of defence” would be put on ice. It would remain a fully developed tool that could carry out moderate tasks and manage certain operations without harbouring any serious political ambitions.

A few weeks away from the NATO summit in Lisbon scheduled for November 19th and 20th, the Thomas More Institute has decided to review the issue of defence policy and politics in the EU and the prospects offered by the Lisbon Treaty.

¹ The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) forms an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It aims to help maintain peace and international security by giving the EU the ability to use military or civilian means to prevent conflicts and to deal with international crises.

1 Figures and data

The data used mainly comes from the European Defence Agency (EDA)¹. As the EDA was formed in 2004, the first figures shown are for 2005. If data from a longer time period is required, it is possible to refer to figures provided by NATO and publications by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

A. Defence expenditure in European Union countries

Table 1 – Changes in defence expenditure and military strength in European Union countries²

	2006	2007	2008
Expenditure			
Total (billions of Euros)	201	204	200
Related to total expenditure (%)	3.80	3.70	3.50
Related to GDP (%)	1.78	1.69	1.63
Per capita (Euros)	412	417	406
Per soldier (Euros)	103 602	111 117 (+7.2%)	111 198 (+0.1%)
Military strength			
Total	2 424 939	2 294 274 (-5.4%)	2 234 487 (-2.6%)
Total soldiers	1 940 112	1 836 882 (-5.3%)	1 800 707 (-2.0%)
Total civilians	484 827	457 392 (-5.7%)	433 780 (-5.2%)
Soldiers deployed on operations	83 300	77 900	80 177
Investments (procurement and R&D) per soldier	20 002	22 795 (+13.9%)	23 274 (+2.1%)

Source : EDA

¹ The EDA was founded by the Council of Ministers in July 2004 before being institutionalised by the Lisbon Treaty. It aims to develop defence capabilities for crisis management and to promote and reinforce European cooperation with regard to armament. It also strives to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and to create a competitive European market for defence equipment as well as to support research.

² Not including Denmark. The EDA does not have any data for this country.

Table 2 – Comparison 2009

	Expenditure in 2009 (billions of \$)	Progression, 2000-2009 (%) ¹	Expenditure per capita (\$)	Proportion of GDP in 2008 (%)	Proportion of world total (%)
European Union	297	14	596	1.7 ²	19.4
United States	661	75.8	2 100	4.3	43
China	100	217 ⁵	74.6 ⁵	2.0 ⁵	6.6 ⁵
Russia	53.3 ⁵	105 ⁵	378 ⁵	3.5 ⁵	3.5 ⁵
Japan	51	-1.3	401	0.9	3.3
Saudi Arabia	41.3	66.9	1 603	8.2	2.7
World	1 531³	49.2	224	2.7	100

Sources : AED and SIPRI

B. Disparities between member States

Table 3 – Military expenditure and military strength in European Union countries

	Defence expenditure in 2008 (millions of €)	Expenditure related to GDP (%)	Progression between 2000 and 2008 (%)	Military strength	Investments (millions of €) ⁴	R&D expenditure (millions of €)
Germany	31 735	1.27	-9.2	251 616	6 506	1 213.4
Austria	2 558	0.9	3.5	27 300	353	1
Belgium	4 252	1.23	-3.1	37 075	358	9.6
Bulgaria	797	2.34	29	33 881	170	0.4
Cyprus	301	1.78	-17.6	12 507	18	0
Denmark	3 050	1.3	6.9	18 000	705	5 349 ⁵
Spain	12 756	1.16	32.9	137 800	2 851	276.7

¹ With prices remaining constant, US\$ 2008.

² Estimate.

³ Including 1 147 billion dollars (74.9%) for the ten countries which spend the most on defence, or 1 254 (81.9%) when counting the top 15.

⁴ Equipment procurement and R&D.

⁵ 2006 figures.

Table 3 – Military expenditure and military strength in European Union countries (continued)

	Defence expenditure in 2008 (millions of €)	Expenditure related to GDP (%)	Progression between 2000 and 2008 (%)	Military strength	Investments (millions of €) ⁶	R&D expenditure (millions of €)
Estonia	294	1.85	178	3 010	67	1.1
Finland	2 463	1.32	26.8	34 997	683	44
France	45 362	2.32	5.3	347 200	9 539	3 231
Greece	6 192	2.55	11.4	133 775	2 140	7.4
Hungary	1 286	1.22	-10.1	20 967	195	1
Ireland	1 077	0.58	6.3	10 377	94	0
Italy	22 631	1.44	-9.8	186 956	3 302	341.1
Latvia	370	1.60	334.2	5 441	55	0.3
Lithuania	363	1.12	69.2	8 637	66	0
Luxembourg⁷	158	0.43	63.7	849	63	0
Malta	28	0.50	20.7	2 120	0.4	0
Netherlands	8 488	1.43	8.1	46 091	1 409	0
Poland	5 974	1.66	50.3	130 450	896	54
Portugal	2 536	1.53	7.8	37 346	344	4.7
Czech republic	2 134	1.44	-13.6	24 495	182	18.5
Romania	2 055	1.24	33.3	75 517	351	15.3
United Kingdom	42 005	2.32	21.4	194 330	10 925	4 011.5
Slovakia	994	1.53	27.9	15 413	147	2.5
Slovenia	567	1.48	87.1	6 519	59	19.4
Sweden	4 026	1.23	-22.6	16 827	1 136	299.4

Sources : AED, SIPRI and OTAN

⁶ Equipment procurement and R&D.⁷ For Luxembourg, the figures are for the period 2000-2007.

C. European programmes and operations

Table 4 – Cooperation programmes¹

Millions of €	2005	2006	2007	2008
Equipment procurement expenditure	26 355	29 134	32 325	33 269
Procurement expenditure as part of European cooperation²	4 222	6 078	6 107	7 068
R&T expenditure	2 193	2 656	2 613	2 479
R&T expenditure as part of European cooperation	206	254	347	409

Source : AED

Table 5 – Military and civilian missions carried out under the CSDP (July 2010)

	Launch date	Budget (millions of €)	Military strength (local and international)	Participants	Mission end date
EUFOR Althea (Bosnia)	December 2004	27 (shared costs) ³	1 950	20 EU states, 5 outside EU	Not indicated
EUNAVFOR Atalante	December 2008	8.3 (1 st year)	1 144	8 member states, plus others	12 th December 2012
EUTM Somalia	April 2010	4.8 (1 year)	118	14 EU states	Not indicated
EUPM/BiH (Bosnia)	January 2003	14.1 million (2010)	284	Member states, plus 4 countries	Not indicated
EULEX Kosovo	2008	265 (February 2008-June 2010)	2 764	Most EU states, 6 outside EU	14 th June 2010 (initial mandate)
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine	November 2005	24 (November 2007- 2009)	200	20 member states	Not indicated
EUMM GEORGIA	1 st October 2008	52.1	405	26 member states	14 th September 2011
EUPOL COPPS Palestinian terr.	1 st January 2006	6.65 (2010)	85	19 EU states, 2 outside EU	Not indicated

¹ Not including Denmark.

² The EDA defines European collaboration as an agreement between at least two Defence Ministers or two companies from EU member countries. Involvement of partners outside the EU must remain below 50% of the total project cost.

³ The cost of the first 12 months was an estimated 71.7 million Euros.

Table 5 – Military and civilian missions carried out under the CSDP (July 2010) (continued)

	Launch date	Budget (millions of €)	Military strength (local and international)	Participants	Mission end date
EUBAM Rafah	November 2005	1.95 (May 2010-May 2011)	21	7 member states	May 2011
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	June 2008	7.8 (April 2009-September 2010)	24	4 member states	30 th September 2010
EUSEC RD Congo	June 2005	35.35 (2005-2010)	44	Not indicated	30 th September 2010
EUPOL RD Congo	1 st July 2007	2.02 (July-September 2010)	60	8 member states and Angola	30 th September 2010 ?
EUJUST LEX Iraq/Brussels	1 st July 2005	40 (expected total)	42	member states	30 th June 2012

Sources : Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union (July 2010 edition), Council of the European Union

Table 6 – Involvement of member countries in CSDP and NATO missions (2010)

	Military strength deployed in the EU's main operations (start of 2010) ¹	Related to number of soldiers (%)	Military strength deployed in NATO missions in 2010 (KFOR/FIAS) ²	Related to number of soldiers (%)
Germany	357	0.14	6 097 (1 507/4 590)	2.42
Austria	118	0.43	437 (434/3)	1.60
Belgium	27	0.07	674 (99/575)	1.82
Bulgaria	209	0.61	558 (18/540)	1.65
Cyprus	1	0.01	0	0
Denmark	61	0.33	918 (188/730)	5.10
Spain	370	0.27	1 558 (3/1 555)	1.13
Estonia	13	0.43	161 (1/160)	5.35

¹ The only missions taken into account are military or civilian missions currently taking place involving over 100 people (EUPOL Afghanistan, EUFOR Althea, EUPM Bosnia, EUMM Georgia, EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine, EUTM Somalia). EUNAVFOR Somalia (1 144 people in July) has not been taken into account. Instead of deploying a battalion or a company, each country is sending a warship and/or an aircraft. These weapons systems and their numbers are therefore taken into account rather than the number of men sent.

² As per 26th February 2010 for the KFOR and 6th August 2010 for the FIAS.

Table 6 – Involvement of member countries in CSDP and NATO missions (2010) (continued)

	Military strength deployed in the EU's main operations (start of 2010) ¹	Related to number of soldiers (%)	Military strength deployed in NATO missions in 2010 (KFOR/FIAS) ²	Related to number of soldiers (%)
Finland	148	0.42	322 (242/80)	0.92
France	272	0.08	4 557 (807/3 750)	1.31
Greece	94	0.07	441 (366/75)	0.33
Hungary	241	1.15	601 (241/360)	2.86
Ireland	73	0.70	238 (232/6)	2.29
Italy	461	0.25	4 809 (1 409/3 400)	2.57
Latvia	10	0.18	170 (0/170)	3.12
Lithuania	17	0.20	245 (0/245)	2.84
Luxembourg	5	0.59	38 (29/9)	0.59
Malta	8	0.38	0	0
Netherlands	149	0.32	390 (10/380 ³)	0.85
Poland	347	0.27	2 857 (227/2 630)	2.19
Portugal	77	0.21	529 (279/250)	1.42
Czech republic	51	0.21	821 (321/500)	3.35
Romania	287	0.38	1 895 (145/1 750)	2.51
United Kingdom	128	0.07	9 505 (5/9 500)	4.89
Slovakia	47	0.30	446 (146/300)	2.89
Slovenia	44	0.67	457 (387/70)	7.01
Sweden	118	0.70	783 (253/530)	4.65

Sources : NATO, Council of the European Union, Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations

¹ The only missions taken into account are military or civilian missions currently taking place involving over 100 people (EUPOL Afghanistan, EUFOR Althea, EUPM Bosnia, EUMM Georgia, EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine, EUTM Somalia). EUNAVFOR Somalia (1 144 people in July) has not been taken into account. Instead of deploying a battalion or a company, each country is sending a warship and/or an aircraft. These weapons systems and their numbers are therefore taken into account rather than the number of men sent.

² As per 26th February 2010 for the KFOR and 6th August 2010 for the FIAS.

³ In February 2010, the Dutch contingent in Afghanistan consisted of nearly 2 000 men.

2 Comparative analysis

There are several observations and statements to be made about the “Europe of defence” and the involvement of European countries based on the data in the above tables.

A. Military expenditure: Europeans swimming against the tide

Between 2000 and 2009, military expenditure increased slightly in EU member states. However, the latest figures for the period 2006-2008 tend to suggest stagnation.

All EU countries are not in the same boat. Apart from in certain Mediterranean countries (Spain and Malta), military expenditure in Western European countries has dropped or increased only slightly. The United Kingdom is an exception, in particular due to its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The greatest increases in Central and Eastern European countries – whereas in Hungary and the Czech republic, 2008 was marked by a drop in defence expenditure – can be explained by several factors: significant economic growth, a desire to modernise the armed forces and to adapt them to meet NATO standards, involvement in international operations and perception of Russia as a security threat.

European disengagement is in danger of growing as a result of the economic crisis, which has already left its mark on certain countries such as Greece. France declared that it wanted to save 3.5 of the 95 billion originally planned for the period 2011-2013. In the United Kingdom, the priority for the (liberal-conservative) coalition government is to reduce the country’s 72 billion pound deficit (85.7 billion Euros), which will inevitably affect the *Department of Defence*. The German Defence Ministry must make savings of 8.4 billion Euros in its budget by 2014 as a result of a severe budget plan.

In contrast to the trend seen in the EU, military budgets in the rest of the world increased by 6% in real terms in 2009 compared to 2008 figures, and by 49% compared to levels in 2000. The economic crisis has had little impact on military expenditure, as most states have chosen to increase public expenditure in order to limit recession. With the exception of Japan, the only countries within the “top 10” to have reduced defence expenditure between 2000 and 2009 are Germany and Italy, two of the main European countries...

B. Poorly allocated defence expenditure

Military expenditure in EU countries is concentrated within a few of its members. France, the United Kingdom and Germany are responsible for 59.5 % of defence expenditure. Spain and Italy, fourth and fifth in terms of military expenditure, contribute 17.7 % to the European total. As for the 22 remaining countries, they make up less than 5 billion Euros each – with the exception of the Netherlands, Greece and Poland.

This can be explained by a number of historic and cultural factors. As former colonial powers, France and the United Kingdom are represented on every ocean, are in possession of the atomic bomb and hold permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Proportionally speaking, military expenditure in Germany is well below its economic and demographic weighting due to the country’s Second World War legacy. In the same way, the extent of military expenditure in Greece in relation to its GDP (2.55% in 2008) is the result of tension with neighbouring Turkey, which is nonetheless a member of NATO and a candidate for EU membership.

Although the influence of France, the United Kingdom and Germany in terms of investments is more or less comparable with their share in the EU’s military budget (64.3%), Paris and London enjoy overwhelming domination in the field of R&D, since the two countries represent 84.2 % of R&D expenditure in the EU.

In short, the contributions made by member countries to the security of the European continent are nowhere near equivalent. Such discrepancies and such an unequal allocation of expenditure are hardly conducive to founding a coherent, autonomous "Europe of defence".

C. Developing more modern armies

The increase in investments and expenditure per soldier between 2006 and 2008 shows that considerable financial efforts have been made to improve the equipment issued to EU armed forces. This increase is partly due to recent interventions outside EU borders. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq played a key role, particularly for France and the United Kingdom. But we must not overlook the existence of several major programmes which have reached the procurement stage, such as the Rafale fighter plane and VBCI in France, or indeed the Eurofighter, developed by the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy.

We must also remember that disparities do exist on the continent. Western and Northern Europe, headed by the United Kingdom, must not be confused with Central-Eastern and Southern Europe, where much less is spent per soldier¹.

The modernization of the armed forces is part of a trend towards military professionalization. Over the last fifteen years, several countries have moved over from a conscript army to a professional army, including France and the Netherlands in 1996, and Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic within the last decade. Out of the 27 member states, only a few countries have retained the idea of compulsory military service. Germany still uses conscripts, but is developing a professional army at the same time as it assesses how well suited its soldier-citizen model is to the missions carried out by the German army today.

Despite military modernisation and professionalization in member states, only slightly more than 80,000 European troops were deployed to foreign territories in 2008, i.e. less than 5% of army personnel in member states, but more than the 60 000 men envisaged by the Helsinki European Council².

D. Europeans in EO: NATO rather than the CSDP

When we think of the external operations carried out under the auspices of the EU, the one that immediately comes to mind is EUFOR Tchad/Central African Republic, launched in January 2008. 23 member states came forward to take part. But behind this façade of unanimity, France was in fact supplying half the overall military strength (1 676 out of 3 314), the second highest contributor being Ireland (473 men), followed by Poland (392). The contribution made by the 20 remaining countries only represented a quarter of the operation and amongst them, Germany and the United Kingdom provided just 4 and 5 men respectively.

However, the involvement of EU countries in the main CSDP civilian and military operations does show a more balanced division of efforts than the focus on EUFOR Tchad/CAR might suggest. In fact, the Europeans are very good at managing and sharing missions of lesser importance. At best, each country supplies a few hundred soldiers, policemen or civilians.

Most of the soldiers from EU member countries on external operations are there as part of NATO, even when they are not members of the organization, as is the case of Finland. Such involvement naturally has an effect on European deployments. One of the reasons put forward to explain the United Kingdom's low commitment to EUFOR Tchad/CAR was an "overheating" of the British military contingent due to deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹ See also: Joachim Hofbauer, Roy Levy, Gregory Sanders and Matthew Zlatnik, *European Defence Trends. Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks and the Industrial Base*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2010, p. 4. Online: http://csis.org/files/publication/100518_European_Defence_Trends.pdf (consulted on 5th August 2010). This memorandum concerns the European continent and not the EU.

² At the Helsinki Council, member states undertook that by 2003, they would be able to deploy military units of up to 50 000 or 60 000 men within 60 days and keep them in place for at least one year as part of missions known as the Petersberg tasks. These tasks, which were established by the Petersberg declaration adopted at the WEU Ministerial Council in June 1992, cover humanitarian and evacuation missions, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking missions).

The EU's military and civilian operations are often organised in close cooperation with the United Nations or NATO¹. Ever since the early stages of the CFSP, there has been a constant relationship between the EU and NATO, and the two organizations complement each other very well. One took over from the other in Macedonia and in Bosnia (Althea succeeded the SFOR). More recently, when the conflict with Russia came to an end in Georgia, it was easier to send men to the area waving the EU flag than the NATO flag.

However, the failure of the EU and NATO to reach an agreement last January caused problems for the members of EUPOL Afghanistan. Despite the agreements known as "Berlin plus", coordination during operations between NATO and the EU still leaves a lot to be desired due to disagreements between certain member countries of the EU and/or NATO...

E. Progress in the field of industrial cooperation

European programmes carried out jointly between more than one country only represent a minority share of procurement (21.2%) and R&T (16.5%) in EU member countries. However, this type of European cooperation has increased significantly since 2005: + 67.4% for procurement and + 98.5% for R&T.

One of the EDA's roles is to develop cooperation between member countries, which places the agency at the centre of the recent growth in this field. Twenty European countries invested in the EDA's first research programme on the protection of military forces in an urban environment (*Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection*), and eleven invested in a second programme designed to reflect on the impact of emerging technologies on the battlefield (*Joint Investment Programme on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies*). We must not forget that the agency's budget has increased considerably since it was founded. From its original level of 1.9 million Euros in 2004, it rose to 28.6 million in 2009, i.e. an increase of 2.6 million in relation to 2008. It is made up of a functional component and an operational component designed to finance studies of a technical or operational nature that are in the best interests of all member states².

Although European cooperation is an ongoing project, it could well be discouraged by the difficult financial and budgetary context due to the priority given to national companies by member states and to the lack of structuring programmes. Despite the Transall, Jaguar, Hot and Milan missile programmes born within the last few decades, the NH 90 and Tiger helicopters which now equip European armies and the A400M transport aircraft due to arrive in the next few years, Europe is currently suffering from a lack of major new cooperation projects.

¹ Pierre Bourlot, "Les opérations de la PESD", *Défense nationale*, July 2008, pp. 72-79.

² This budget is added to by *ad hoc* projects launched under the EDA. At the moment, the project portfolio stands at an estimated 350 million Euros.

3 Challenges and prospects on the eve of the first anniversary of the Lisbon Treaty

Despite the different degrees of commitment shown by member states, the “Europe of defence” has established itself as an integral part of the EU over the last few years. There have been many military and civilian operations involving all the European countries, be it to different extents, which have achieved a certain level of efficiency, as shown by the rapidity of the reaction to the Georgian crisis. Cooperation is growing. Initiatives have been taken to remedy shortcomings as far as capacity is concerned, such as the launch of the first European Air Transport Command (EATC)¹. The United Kingdom, which was hostile to the “Europe of defence” at one point, no longer opposes the idea. The *Green paper* dated February 2010 emphasises the importance of cooperation between Europeans and the role of the EU in crisis management to complement NATO².

Despite the progress made, “Europe of defence” still encounters several difficulties. First of all, it lacks transparency and visibility, in particular due to the different forms taken by cooperation and the limited information provided regarding operations. Secondly, it lacks credibility, not in terms of military strength, but as far as a desire to go beyond simple crisis management is concerned. This impression is reinforced by Europe’s current preoccupation with economic issues, resulting in a reduction in defence budgets and a fall in the resources available for external operations. Not to mention structural weaknesses in terms of investments in R&D and R&T in the longer term.

A. A treaty which opens up the realm of possibilities

The Lisbon Treaty introduces several new ideas which could open up realms of possibilities for the CSDP. Firstly, it anchors the EDA within the legal and institutional context of the EU. Secondly, it comprises a *solidarity clause* (art. 222) and a *mutual assistance clause* (art. 42)³. Lastly, and most importantly, it paves the way for a certain amount of flexibility in defence and security by authorising greater cooperation, by introducing the possibility of implementing permanent structured cooperation and by merging the three pillars.

Under the terms of reinforced cooperation, on third of member states is entitled to launch an operation if such an operation is thought to help achieve aims consistent with those of the Union, to preserve its interests or reinforce its integration process. The idea of reinforced cooperation was introduced by the Amsterdam treaty (1997) and extended by the Lisbon Treaty to include defence. This type of cooperation is considered to offer great potential, particularly since it introduces more flexibility in the use of battlegroups (GT 1 500). In the past, failure to use these units, which were founded in 2004 and have been fully operational since 1st January 2007⁴, illustrated the limits of a decision process which relied on the unanimity of member states. “Use them or lose them!” was one of the slogans proclaimed under the Swedish presidency of the EU in 2009.

Permanent structured cooperation should be a way of joining together member states that meet certain criteria in terms of military capacity and that have made relevant binding commitments. Countries wishing to become involved in cooperation must also undertake to meet certain objectives, particularly with regard to expenditure and the establishment of common armament programmes⁵. Permanent structured

¹ The EATC is an operational command unit in charge of regulating military air movements of Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. However, a country may reserve the right to use aircraft for national missions. In concrete terms, the EATC plans and coordinates passenger and cargo transport between aircraft depending on destination and availability, not merely in terms of nationality. EATC headquarters are located in Eindhoven.

² MoD, *Adaptability and Partnership. Issues for the Strategic Defence Review*, February 2010, p. 32.

³ This mutual assistance clause reasserts the supremacy of NATO for its member countries.

⁴ Caroline Henrion, *Les groupements tactiques de l'Union européenne*, Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la paix et la sécurité, 28th January 2010. Online: http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/NOTES_ANALYSE/2010/NA_2010-01-18_FR_C-HENRION.pdf (consulted on 15th April 2010). In Caroline Henrion’s opinion, as well as difficulties resulting from the decision process, battlegroups are faced with additional challenges of a political and an operational nature, which need to be solved.

⁵ Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union in its reformed version states that “Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding

cooperation can therefore be regarded as a tool which aims to strengthen the military capacity of member states, whilst improving their complementary nature and consequently, their efficiency. Spain, who wanted to promote a Europe of security and defence under its presidency (first half of 2010) ordered a report from the Egmont Institute (Belgium) to reflect on the criteria for countries wishing to become part of permanent structured cooperation¹. Unique, permanent cooperation established following a decision of the Council with a qualified majority and no minimum threshold of member states could be regarded as a cornerstone to strengthen the "Europe of defence" as far as differences in budget and capacities between member states are concerned. Although the debate seems to have subsided somewhat, it nonetheless continues. Clarification is required regarding certain legal aspects, the exact allocation criteria and added value from the EDA.

Reinforced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation mainly concern the countries with the highest defence budgets. However, there are many possible ways of working around a central core. Several countries which joined the EU in 2004, first and foremost Hungary, play an active role in EU operations. What is more, certain smaller countries can offer centres of expertise and are very keen to cooperate in specific areas².

What is more, the Lisbon Treaty merges the three pillars, offering possibilities for synergies in military, civilian and spatial areas. In doing so, it gives the Commission and its research programmes a greater role (FP, Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development), making it possible to involve all Europeans in strategic defence research programmes and to pool R&D and R&T resources.

B. A "Europe of defence" with a challenging future

Faced with the current economic crisis, the tendency in Europe is to withdraw into itself and to concentrate on its financial difficulties. But more generally, if the "Europe of defence" has no common goals, it will remain only modest in size. The same applies to the development of the EDA, whose financial resources depend on the goodwill of member states and on the need for a common foreign policy. As Henry Kissinger wrote in the 1970s, a defence policy is a defence serving politics. Declaring the former depends on the aims of the second³.

In this respect, today's challenges are twice as high. Reviving a shared history that will guarantee a common policy, through the course of jointly led operations, and developing civilian and military crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities on an international scale could, in time, lead to a common defence policy. Although NATO still takes precedence for all its European members, whether or not they are part of the Union, EU member states should be capable of ensuring their own security. In the South, the Sahel is a fragile area to which we should be particularly attentive. The struggle against Islamist terrorism, backed by the struggle to strengthen security and development in the Sahel, can constitute a major project for a Europe of defence and security that is experiencing difficulty due to heavy budgetary constraints and the tendency of member countries to shift their focus inwards to their national agendas. In the East, Russia's foreign policy with regard to Europe casts doubt on the motivations of such a powerful country that does not appear to be promoting security in the eyes of many European countries.

Given the lack of any real political unity or sufficient convergence, Europeans cannot indefinitely and exclusively depend on an American ally with its own economic and political interests. In these times of economic crisis, building up a "Europe of defence" cannot continue to be a weight on the shoulders of those few countries and companies that have no choice but to conquer markets beyond old Europe to avoid having to lay workers off.

missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework." It should be noted that the EDA is to act as a guardian of reinforced structured cooperation by contributing to the regular evaluation of contributions made by participating member states in terms of capabilities.

¹ Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, *Permanent Structured Cooperation for Effective European Armed Forces*, Policy Brief, Egmont Institute, March 2010. Online: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-gov/SPB-9_PSCD.pdf (consulted on 16th April 2010).

² Arnaud Danjean, *Le développement de la politique de défense de l'Union européenne*, Entretien d'Europe, Fondation Robert Schuman, 6th September 2010. Online: http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/entretiens_europe/ee-48-fr.pdf (consulted on 7th September 2010).

³ Quoted by Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, "L'improbable défense européenne", *Hérodote. Revue de Géographie and de Géopolitique*, N° 128, February 2008.

Europe is once more at a crossroads when it comes to its dependence on non-European players. If it does not move forward and bring about closer military cooperation, in time, the progress already made by the "Europe of defence" could be called into question. In the long term, there is no guarantee that simply maintaining the status quo will be a valid strategic option. This will be one of the challenges facing the Polish presidency of the EU (second half of 2011), since Warsaw has declared that it intends to reinvest a significant amount of money in European defence.



Research Programme



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