

The “new improved NATO” is starting its journey. And only the Bush administration can be held responsible for NATO's new face. At the beginning of February, the German chancellor Angela MERKEL spoke of her wishes to see NATO reinforce its liaisons with countries like Australia, Japan and South Korea, because NATO can develop with these countries “a multitude of political activities that can lead to a military cooperation”. Yes, NATO is about to change its purpose, maybe even its nature. Facing “new global threats”, the decision makers seem eager to transform NATO into a global organisation. And what about the EU? The European Union appears weak, pale and ready to fall apart. Jean-Sylvestre MONGRENIER analyses the gap and remarks the necessity for a lucid view; the calling, so often repeated, under the name of *soft power*, this basic piece of the *brave new world*, with multiple players under UN, has something from a fairy tale. The sophisms, the illusions, and the philanthropic generalities cannot compensate for the force, the power and the will to just be. In order not to go under the gaping depths of past history, the Europeans are the ones that must take the necessary measures to face the challenges of our times. They need to rearm themselves. “Understand or else you will be eaten”, said the Sphinx... Timeless as well as clever.

## Is NATO the future of Europe ? Power and destiny

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**Contrepoint**

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## **“Keep on going ahead my children, the sea shivers in front of you”**

Vasco da Gama, speaking to his desperate crew in the middle of a storm

**T**he European construction started over half a century ago, close to the thirty-years war, that brought an end to the long hegemony of Europe's people and nations. The Western cycle that began on the year 1000, the crusades, the propagation of Christianity, then came to an end. In the context of the Cold War, this European political genesis derives from the American containment policy and Marshall Plan. The success of ECSC<sup>1</sup> made most think first of Europe as an Europe of Defence, but after the failure of the European Community of Defence in 1954, the pan-Europeans concentrated on the economic area and on the creation of a single market (the Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957). At the beginning of the XXI<sup>th</sup> century, the launch of a unique currency crowned the great continental market started in the 80's. Reaching maturity, this economical- monetary cycle is supposed to open a political-military cycle. Europe is going towards “Powerful Europe”.

The vision of an all-mighty Europe needs a one voiced politically structured assembly on the world scene, endowed with strategic capabilities. It is about the birth of a new global actor in the international relations- powerful Europe, a Europe that defends and protects Europe as well as the rest of the world.

Speaking about this political genesis is not that easy. The simple factual observation denies us the right to fall under the illusion of historicism. The CFSP<sup>2</sup> has progressed since the Treaty of Maastricht, but the truth is that the project of Europe of Defence is not the same as the Defence of Europe. Although it was seen as a modest attempt, the European constitution gave the illusion of maybe. Its failure delays the dream of a Powerful Europe. The body of the structure is shaking.

The new NATO is going through a complete change and it is in this new area of action where the most important European states, under the United States, are allied together against the confines of the old continent. Adequately equipped, NATO projects force and power in the “out-zone” – Afghanistan is the new front line – and begins to resemble with a global anti-chaos alliance. Is the European Union destined to reduce itself into a large transatlantic- liberal group under the term of opened societies, Euro-Asiatic hinterland and its Mediterranean surroundings? Can the Europeans continue their political existence, in the original sense of the term, by giving up the power? How can one find the vital force that stood behind the people and nations of the former Europe, and how can one projected it into the world?

### **Europe of the defence is not the defence of Europe**

**T**he same expression of Europe of defence relates back to a limited ambition consisting in taking charge of the crises management and the missions irrelevant for the collective defence of Europe. This ambition is first mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, signed February 7 1992, with the creation of a CFSP conditioned by the “formulation of a common security policy that can create a common defence”. It is reconfirmed by the Amsterdam (1997) and Nice Treaty (2000). During this time, the French-British declaration from Saint-Malo, December 4 1998, helped relaunch the dynamics. The Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999) fixed a global objective defined as follows: to deploy 60000 men with a delay of less than sixty days, during at least a year in an external operational theatre. The purposes of this European force are stated by the Petersburg declaration, 19

<sup>1</sup> Signed in Paris, 18 April 1951, the Paris Treaty, creates the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between 6 countries (Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas) for 50 years.

<sup>2</sup> Common Foreign and Security Policy, initiated by the treaty of Maastricht (1992).



June 1992: humanitarian missions, evacuation of people, keeping the peace missions, including missions of combat<sup>3</sup>.

The "Europe of the defence" is not at all the defence of Europe and representative of security. The European Union is not always a community of destiny, even if there are emerging threats on its South flank, from the Mediterranean to the Middle East. With the Nice treaty, CFSP is now completed by the development of European politico-military tools – Security and Policy committee (COPS), European Union Military committee (CMUE), European Union Etat major (EMUE) – in Brussels, placed under the authority of the European Council. The key character of the CFSP is the High-Representative of the European Union-Javier Solana since 1999, responsible with the "European Security Strategy"<sup>4</sup>.

It does not exist any important permanent European organization comparable to the SHAPE of NATO<sup>5</sup>. A European operation passes therefore by the Atlantic organisation, responsible in this case to assure the strategic planning, or by a "nation framework" that furnishes a strategic multinational Etat major. The question of a "general European head-quarters" remains an unsolved transatlantic and intra-European issue.

The European Union has adopted a capacity policy: the adoption of a catalogue of forces and capacities necessary for the global objective of Helsinki (100000 men, 300/400 combat air crafts, 80 vessels); compendium of the member states contributions, identification of gaps and the adoption of an action plan for the capacities; the creation of an European Armament Agency. Adopted in June 2004, the objective 2010 is more qualitative (reaction, interoperability, sustainability) but it still needs to mobilize the necessary defence budgets to cover the whole period. This is no small thing...

Launched at the times of the Balkan wars, it is in the South-East Europe where the Europe of Defence must pass its first trial. The Western Balkans represent a buffer zone within the Middle East and it is a sure thing that Europeans must take the relays of NATO, to consolidate peace and reinforce the post-war societies in the region. The "Concordia" mission (2003), in Macedonia, "Althea" mission (end of 2004), in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were accomplished with the help of SHAPE, under the authority of Deputy-SACEUR<sup>6</sup>, within the framework of Berlin plus agreements. The United States and NATO remain therefore present. In the end, Europe of defence fills the office given to it by George W. Bush in January 2001 : "We want our allies to become the guardians of peace in the Balkans".

## The assumption of NATO

**I**nevitably, Europe of defence brings us back to NATO. Military extensions of the containment policy, The Atlantic Alliance and NATO were a result of the Soviet threats and of the Western calls for an American engagement. The diplomatic history and the political theory would have wanted that a victorious alliance did not survive to the disappearance of the enemy that stayed behind its creation. Far from disintegrating, the link of Euro-Atlantic defence maintained itself and NATO started its expansion to the East. The continuous growing of its functions to missions called

<sup>3</sup> Petersburg missions were defined in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU is a direct result of the Brussels Treaty, signed 17 March 1948 and modified in October 1954. The responsibilities for crisis management were transferred to the European Union in 2000 but the Interparliamentary Assembly of WEU is still important in pursuing its action and the modified Brussels treaty, comprising the article for mutual defense (article V) is still valid.

<sup>4</sup> Endowed with certain means and powers, these institutions gave birth to an European "polemarque". The "polemarque" was the magistrate in the ancient Greek towns, entrusted with the military issues. Adopted on 12 December 2003, the European security strategy is founded on an orientation document that underlines the Union's interests zones, insisting for the prevention of conflicts. This document entitled "Pour une Europe sûre dans un monde meilleur" is available on [http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=266&lang=FR&mode=q](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=266&lang=FR&mode=q).

<sup>5</sup> The SHAPE is the general head-quarters of SACEUR, the Supreme Commandant of Allied Forces in Europe.

<sup>6</sup> British general officer, the *deputy-SACEUR* is the adjunct of SACEUR. He controls the means of NATO placed under the disposition of the European Union according to the Berlin plus agreements (Strategic Concept of the Alliance, 1999, part III, § 30).



“non-article 5” (maintaining and imposing peace, security, stability), accompanies the definition of a vast area of cooperation through programmes like “Partners for peace”<sup>7</sup> and “Mediterranean Dialogue”<sup>8</sup>. Starting with the 1990's, these security superstructures include therefore the European oriental and meridional borders since these borders have become objects of the UE's “Neighbourhood Politics” and of the “Security Strategy”. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were the first trials of the atlanticism after the Cold War.

The security dynamics is also one of the enlargement. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic became members of NATO in April 1999. In the times of September 11 2001, President Bush expresses his opinion in favor of a “big NATO (...) from the Baltic to the Black Sea”, the State assistant secretary Richard Armitage recommending “a more powerful and robust enlargement as possible”. The decision was stopped by the time of the Atlantic Summit of Prague in 21-22 November 2002. Less than two years later, the Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, also Romania and Bulgaria became NATO members in April 2004.

The Prague Declaration sustains that NATO will remain opened for the “European democracies willing and capable to assume the responsibilities and obligations that the status of NATO member brings”. The Declaration concerns the Croatian Prime-Minister, Albania, and the Former Republic of Macedonia. In May 2003, the governments of these three states signed together with the United States the Adriatic Paper. The Baltic and Black sea and the “Gothic isthmus” that links them, constitute the new borders of the atlanticism, limited by the Russian-CEI couple. Applying to become members of NATO, Ukraine and the Caucasian states open the gate towards the Caspian and central Asia.

### **The transformation: towards an anti-chaos global alliance**

**I**nitiator of NATO's “big-bang”, the Prague Summit is also responsible for the transformation. Engaged in the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, the Atlantic organisation slides from a geographical perception to a functional one, regarding also the “out-zone” security issues.

The Prague Declaration stipulates that NATO must be able to align “the forces capable to deploy as quickly as possible, wherever and whenever they are needed (...), to carry on long distance and long time operations”. The Allies decided to ratify an accepted concept of defence against terrorism. This needs a change in the commanding and force structures. The only NATO general head-quarters in the territory of the United-States, the Allied Atlantic Commandment (SACLANT) was transformed into a Strategic Transformation Commandment (ACT)<sup>9</sup>. The structure of the forces is centred on mobility and reaction and the Allies were invited to contribute to the creation of a NATO reaction force, the NATO Response Force (NRF). These 21 000 soldiers, with a high level of training and availability (high readiness force) are European unities. Able of intervening in 3 to 5 days “wherever it is necessary”, it should also be capable to master entire operational theatres during at least 30 days while awaiting supplies.

The NRF will become fully operational until October 2006 the latest. Endowed with high technology, commandment and control capacities, fighting against the “new threats of the XXI<sup>th</sup> century” the NRF would intervene alongside the American unities, far from the historical area of NATO responsibility. Trained to step in the combat first, on an operational stage adapted to each mission, NRF is, according to the UN formula “the drop of water that can put off a fire”. It must be capable to act alone against the enemy and to save itself from a harbour or an airport in hostile conditions.

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html>.

<sup>8</sup> See <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> Located in Norfolk (Virginia).



For NATO, the transformation consists in moving from a heavy and static structure to an expeditionary model that can allow it to intervene across Europe and beyond. Here and now, Afghanistan is one of the external operations. Tomorrow maybe it will be the turn of the geopolitical Black sea/Caucasian/Caspian area and the Mediterranean basin. The cooperation initiative belonging to Istanbul will engulf the Middle East among NATO's interests<sup>10</sup>.

### The sliding of the American geostrategic gravity centres

Nevertheless the "all NATO" has its limits, the imbalances and asymmetries between the Americans and the Europeans blocking the permanence of this transatlantic link. The comparison of strategic devices brings us closer to the transatlantic gap, this concept designating the important quantitative and qualitative breach between the European and American military capacities.

This gap is budgetary, technological and military. Thus the ratio is of 2 to 5 between the military expenditures of the Atlantic Alliance European members and the American ones. If one considers only the R&D military sector, the proportion is 1 to 6. A report of the Economic Observatory of Defence, depending on the French Ministry of Defence, stipulates that the United States' effort of R&D increased by 40% between 1990 and 2000, whereas for the main European powers (Germany, Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Sweden) it has diminished of 22%. It concludes that there is a "true technological disarmament" of Europe<sup>11</sup>. This ratio is from 1 to 15 for the spatial military expenditures. At last, the capacities of European projection represent only 10 to 20% compared to the American ones.

We must add that for the new conservative Robert Kagan, the transatlantic gap has a moral component. "The Europeans live on Venus, the Americans on Mars"<sup>12</sup>. The most optimists underline the superiority of the soft power over the hard power but the failure of European diplomacy in the Iranian nuclear matter was justified in this type of *ex post* rationalisation; the persuasion rests on the capacities of posted constraints. This big gap between the North-Atlantic powers threatens the allies cooperation, the American armed forces and the European ones encountering different difficulties in manoeuvring together a theatre of operations. NATO can lose its strategic and political coherence in order to transform itself in a legitimate diplomatic instance of the American institutions. The asymmetries between allies are also susceptible to nourish the discourse of isolationist currents of the other Atlantic, who can find themselves carried away by an eventual American failure in Iraq and in the "Big Middle East".

In fact, American military redeployment announced by Georges W. Bush in Cincinnati, the 16 of August 2004, raises different interrogations. In terms of this big disturbance, the American troops deployed in the operation EUCOM (*Europe Command*)<sup>13</sup> will limit to 50 000 people against 112 000 today and more than 330 000 fifteen years ago. Here and now, only 10% of the American troops are at the disposal of EUCOM. In a near future, the ration will drop to 3%. The actual redeployment is one of the dimensions of sliding from the global centres of geostrategy to the Middle East and Asia. Present to welcome the new American bases, certain countries of the new Europe, following the

<sup>10</sup> Launched in 2004, June 28, after the Atlantic Summit organised in the Byzantine Empire's old capital, The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) wanted to contribute to the long term security in the Middle Orient geopolitical area by making an offer of security cooperation between NATO and the Middle Orient states. This offer concerns the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, South Arabia, United Arab Emirates) but it is opened to all the countries that share its objectives, especially in the matters concerning the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons See <http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html>.

<sup>11</sup> Report from 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf Publishers, New-York, 2003.

<sup>13</sup> Based in Stuttgart, the USEUCOM is the grand American regional Commandment that comprises Europe, the Mediterranean basin, North Africa, Middle East, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. The EUCOM is also the SACEUR.



example of Bulgaria and Romania, benefit from this movement but it remains only little until the European continent and NATO will lose their geostrategic centrality. The vitality of transatlantic liaisons and the defence of the Old Order needs a bigger European investment in the military issues. No to any Euro-atlanticism without an European military pillar.

### The concept of "*haltère*"

**T**he theme of the European pillar sends us back to the origins of the atlanticism. Theorist of containment and director of Policy Planning Staff (State Department), George Kennan proposed to combine an European entity with an American one for the purpose of counterbalancing and containment of the Soviet power<sup>14</sup>.

The concept of "*haltère*" consisted in restoring a European power centre, economically integrated and united from a political point of view, filling the geopolitical empties left by the war, allowing a resistance to communism. Considered then as a third force, Europe would have prevented the United States from engaging in a constraining alliance, assuming the role of a superpower. Contrary to the wishes of the State department, the western European governments called for the military engagement of the United States in the old continent.

For George Kennan, an alliance between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean could only sabotage the advent of a united Europe. He preferred a specifically European political and military organisation, with no American participation<sup>15</sup>. The link between the European and the North-American entity would have been ensured by a unilateral guarantee of the United States, doubled by a military assistance that allowed to bring forward a strategic European device. The ideas of George Kennan were initially preferred by President Harry Truman and the signature of the Treaty of Brussels (17 March 1948) seemed to make real his concept of "*haltère*". "Altogether, wrote Bruno Colson, the United States (...) wanted more than the Europeans themselves, especially the British, to see an independent Europe"<sup>16</sup>. The events started to accelerate, ending with an hegemony by invitation started by the implementation of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO.

### The virtues of checks and balances

**B**y the virtues of checks and balances one refers to the necessary contribution of a European pillar to the Western geostrategic cohesion, it is one of the recurrent themes of Atlanticism. July 4 1962, John F. Kennedy launches the "big picture" of a general reorganisation of the transatlantic relations stating : "I will say, here and now, in this Independence Day, that the United States are ready for an interdependence declaration, that we are willing to discuss with a united Europe the ways to form a concrete Atlantic association- an association mutually beneficial between the new union emerging today in Europe and the old American union founded a century and three quarters ago"<sup>17</sup>. This partnership has an important economic and commercial dimension (Kennedy round) but also a military one, with the project of a multilateral nuclear force possessed in principal by NATO. During the Cold War, the idea of a global partnership underlies the debates among allies

<sup>14</sup> Diplomat initiated in Russian culture, George Kennan is the author of the "long telegram", 22 February 1946, send from Moscow to the State Department. It presented the principal lines of the Soviet attitude. A year later, under the pseudonym of "Mr. X", he explains in the Foreign Affairs how to contain the Soviet power. See Jack Matlock, « George Kennan, diplomate et stratège », *Politique Américaine*, n°3, Winter 2005-2006, pp. 73-88.

<sup>15</sup> This is the place to remind the wish many times formulated by Raymond Aron, exasperated by the European jeremiads, to see the Americans leaving their old continent in order to oblige its responsible decision makers to take their security problems into their own hands. See *République impériale. Les états-Unis dans le monde, 1945-1972*, Calmann-Levy, Paris, pp. 320-323.

<sup>16</sup> Bruno Colson, *Europe : repenser les alliances*, Economica, 1995, p. 43.

<sup>17</sup> Speech held in the Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 4 July 1962.





concerning the burden-sharing, the fair division of military duties being impossible without a division of power.

After the cold victory of the West, the necessity of a “partnership in the leadership” is underlined by James Baker, the State administration Secretary of Bush Sr. administration, addressing to the Unified Germany<sup>18</sup>. Confronted with the Iraqi crises and with the hypothesis of a Western schism, different European and American personalities made an appeal for a new transatlantic partnership<sup>19</sup>. In their analyses, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger stressed the urgency of a new European-American equilibrium, in order to guarantee the continuance of atlanticism. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February 2005, George W. Bush’s visit after the chiefs of state and government of the European Union reunited in a summit, was seen as a first step towards a political and strategic partnership between Washington and Brussels.

### **A European military core with a federal vocation**

**T**he employment of power has its own laws; the greatest investment of Europeans in the *res militari* conditions the renegotiation of the transatlantic partnership. Founded in July 2004, The Agency of European Defence (AED) follows this perspective. Placed under the authority of the High Representative of CFSP, Javier Solana, the AED comprises a committee composed of the EU's ministries of defence. Their decisions are taken by a qualified majority with two draws. Its mission is to develop European military capacities, to conduct armament programmes, to relaunch R&D efforts and to reinforce the industrial and technological base of defence (BITD). The EU state members must provide AED with the necessary resources. On a more general plan, the debate of the convention on the future of Europe (2002-2003) and the constitutional project sketched the lines of a future European defence: extension of Petersberg missions, the adoption of a mutual assistance clause among the member states, the set up of a permanent cooperation structure (CSP) among the more going states.

A work group of the Association EuroDéfense-France<sup>20</sup> transformed CSP into a major theme of reflection and specified the possible modalities of application within the European Union. Relying on a voluntary engagement to take actions in common in a framework of time and rules well precised, the principle of cooperation structures consists in emerging a hard military core. The text of the constitutional treaty, keeping silence on the definition of satisfactory criteria and of the attainment levels, EuroDéfense-France had therefore formulated a number of propositions in terms of the volume of forces left at the disposal of CSP, of the integration in Multinational Inter-armed Tactical Groups (GTIM) and commandment capacities (etats major). These objectives mean availability, reaction, deployment, interoperability. The proposed criteria also imply the efforts of investment regarding the equipment and the full participation of the Agency of European Defence.

The European Constitution project was pushed back and the reception of the EuroDéfense-France suggestions was reserved even at the heart of its European counterparts<sup>21</sup>. Only the dispositions

<sup>18</sup> In a speech at Mayence, 31 May 1989, George Bush Senior has already mentioned the “*partnership in leadership*”.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. « Pour le renouveau du partenariat transatlantique », *Le Monde*, 15 mai 2003. The text reminds that « une Europe unie et libre était un objectif central pour les Etats-Unis d’après la guerre froide ; objectif qui demeure après le 11 septembre (...). Parce que ni les Etats-Unis ni l’Europe ne sont omnipotents, les deux auront besoin d’aide pour assurer leur propre sécurité économique et physique, sans parler des menaces au-delà de leurs frontières respectives ». A group of European personalities (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Felipe Gonzales, Douglas Hurd, Helmut Kohl, ...) sustained that “l’Alliance atlantique renouvelée demeure le principal pilier du partenariat entre l’Europe et l’Amérique” and that “les prémisses d’un partenariat transatlantique fort consistent en une Europe stable, une union européenne solide et dynamique”. It is too far to define that “le développement d’une défense européenne efficace ne compromet pas l’OTAN ; au contraire, il renforcera l’OTAN si les deux côtés de l’Atlantique le souhaitent fermement” (“Europe-USA: l’atout majeur”, *Le Monde*, 15-16 juin 2003).

<sup>20</sup> See <http://www.eurodefence.net>.

<sup>21</sup> The proposals for Eurodefence-France were presented in the XI<sup>th</sup> International Association Eurodefence Meeting, Paris, 30 September and 1 of October 2005.



mentioned about the creation of an European military core were taken into consideration. Completed by a common security clause among the voluntary states and by the setting up of an etat major of a strategic level, placed in Brussels, this permanent cooperation structure would form an European pillar of a renewed Atlantic Alliance. In the political field, this hard kernel would have a federal vocation, the intergovernmental method having exhausted its dynamic effects. By making the European community of destiny a reality, the military can offer energy and will.

### **Towards an New Western Empire?**

**B**eyond the technical and military aspects of the project, the rising of a European defence calls for an overall historic and geopolitic reflection about the becoming of the West. To present the challenges that the Europeans and the Westerners are facing, one must understand the "current times of the world" and its rhythms.

If one thinks in terms of centuries and civilizations, it may seem that we are in the occidental cycle started in the year 1000. The affirmation is of course paradoxical. The movement of the Western civilization has comprised all humanity and its technical power allowed it to take advantage over the other cultural areas. Nevertheless, if one follows the analysis of Arnold Toynbee, the primacy of technical sciences and the priority granted to the conquest of the exterior world would have provoked a balance rupture between the capacities of action and the intellectual and spiritual virtues<sup>22</sup>.

The days after the 30-year War that tore apart the Ancient World, the subsidence of Europe and passing on power to the ancient North American and Russian-Siberian peripheries announced the end of the Renaissance<sup>23</sup>. After the Cold War, the affirmation of states carrying different civilization values (China, India) and the Islam's demography, religious and conflict-inducing boom inaugurate a post-occidental area. Times are for the creation of what Arnold Toynbee called an "universal state", this type of imperial structure being more of a defence reaction than a new civilizing ambition.

The grouping of European nations around the United States, the transformation of NATO and the creation of a vast geopolitical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok prefigure a new Western empire. In the current state of things, it is in this system of interactions- the axis Washington-Brussels-Moscow – where the Europeans must think of their becoming, consolidate their positions and increase their weight. On the Euro-Atlantic part of this geopolitic triangle, the issue consists in transforming NATO into a transatlantic bilateral alliance with an American and a European pillar. This is the condition necessary for the Euro-Atlantic Commonwill to spread stability and security into his continent and Eurasia without any roll-back aspects.

On the Euro-Siberian line, Europeans must reason with a Russia tempted by improbable anti-hegemonic coalitions and cautious as for the European Union. The attraction force of the Union and its eventual enlargement to Ukraine are perceived as a threat and, presently, Europe of defence is surpassed by NATO's transformation. Even Moscow favours the relations with this last one through the NATO Russia Council (COR)<sup>24</sup>. Only when the European Union will achieve the critical intensity threshold necessary, it will be able to establish a true political and security dialogue with Russia, to play a pivot role in a future pan-Western Commonwealth and to co-organize a Eurasian security

<sup>22</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, Oxford University Press, 1948 [French édition : *La civilisation à l'épreuve*, Gallimard, Paris, 1951].

<sup>23</sup> According to Julien Freund, « nous ne sommes pas simplement plongés dans une crise prolongée, mais en présence d'un terme, du dénouement d'un règne qui s'achève, un âge historique, celui de la Renaissance, est en train de se désagréger. L'Europe est désormais impuissante à assumer le destin qui fut le sien durant des siècles ». Cf. *La fin de la Renaissance*, PUF, Paris, 1980, p. 8.

<sup>24</sup> The NATO Council- Russia was created after the Rome Declaration, may 28 2002. The COR deals with problems tied to the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, defence missiles etc. See <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html>.





system<sup>25</sup>. Facing the turbulences of the Muslim world and the growing power of China, Russia can only win by establishing solid and lasting partnerships with the West.

### The Prolegomena of a Powerful Europe

**T**he ambition of a powerful Europe supposes the passing of nihilism, this action of negation of fundamental values and the proclamation of the nothing. The constructivist project and the disembodiment of a *sui generis* entity that replaces the founding ideology does not enable one to mask the "malaise dans la civilisation" that affects the Ancient World. Tore apart from the ancestral heritages that stayed at the basis of their foundation, Europeans see their singularity obliterated and their ruling elites not thinking any longer in terms of centuries and continents<sup>26</sup>. The demographic subsidence, the fragility of the European psychic and the big geopolitical fatigue that comes along made them forget all about the Europe-Civilisation that inspired the founding fathers of the Union. In this new century, can we imagine presidents and ministers of the Union closing a summit by evoking the arrows of the Gothic cathedrals?...

The founding fathers had nevertheless the ambition to assert in the political field the European identity and to generate a federal capacity of action. Thus, since 1949, the Charlemagne prize rewards each year a good European. There cannot be a European politics without an anamnesis, a call to the sacred and a recourse to the immemorial. "The coming time is a time that brings and retrieves, wrote Ernst Jünger, and the hours are becoming horns of abundance"<sup>27</sup>, this perpetual tension among present, past and future opens the field of possibility. With fervour and without yielding to despair, the medieval man did not stop from hoping in a *renovatio*: *renovatio imperii* and *renovatio studii*. Dreaded on the long term, the European history was in fact animated by these renaissances and metamorphosis<sup>28</sup>. When America pretends to be the direct heiress of Athena, Rome and Jerusalem, it is good to remember that Europe is the cradle of the New West and the initiator of a transoceanic civilisation with a universal vocation.

### Seapower and Spacepower

**T**hinking of Europe is *ipso facto* thinking of the World and the World's ocean. In its modern meaning, according to Julien Freund, "the idea of Europe is contemporary with the discoveries of America, Africa, India and China, the Pacific Ocean. It was the means for the people that participated in this immense action to give themselves an identity and to differentiate Europe from all these new territories. The adventure brought them to the discovery of the whole world in her spheric limits"<sup>29</sup>.

Also the legitimate concern to stabilize their markets and to develop a new "neighbourhood policy" must not confine the Europeans into a vision too limited, too regional from their interests and from their common destiny. If they gave in in front of "Metternich syndrome", adopting a geocentric and territorial vision of the issues and reports of global force, to the detriment of oceanic, aerial and space dimensions of the grand strategy, they would forget that the world in which power unities are evolving is an ocean-space universe.

<sup>25</sup> The political and security dialogue between Moscow and Brussels was launched after the UE-Russia Summit, May 2000. After October 2001, strategic expert groups were set up and the COPS has monthly meetings with the Russian ambassador.

<sup>26</sup> Giovanni Reale, *Radici culturali e spirituali dell'Europa*, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, 2003 [French edition : *Les racines culturelles et spirituelles de l'Europe*, Mame, 2005].

<sup>27</sup> Ernst Jünger, *Das Sanduhrbuch*, 1954 [French edition : *Le traité du sablier*, Seuil, 1984, p. 52].

<sup>28</sup> Europe's history as a chain of renaissances animated by the will to achieve the initial clarity, see Rémi Brague, *Europe, la voie romaine*, Criterion, 1992, pp. 110-119.

<sup>29</sup> Julien Freund, *La fin de la Renaissance*, PUF, Paris, 1980, p. 16-17.



The globalisation of issues and force reports calls for a sea and space policy. The control of these strategic dimensions conditions the capacity of the European armies to extend their forces and power in the zones where Europeans and Westerners must protect and promote their common interests. Aeroplane carriers air and navy groups, sovereignty missiles, defence anti-missiles, satellite systems and spatial architectures represent power instruments of this destiny community. We cannot speak of an all powerful Europe without a sea policy, space ambitions and the conquest of new territories.

### The challenge of power

**I**t is necessary to go back to the project Powerful Europe, project carried by the "Quai d'Orsay"<sup>30</sup> after the Cold War. We can criticize this French expression that gave birth to incomprehension, hostility or irony from the European allies and partners of Paris. Excessive, is this finalized representation of becoming adequate with the modern Europeans' idea of times? The notion of power is not less essential. To maintain itself in history and to persevere into the being, all human grouping – Town, State, Empire – must act politically, designate the enemy and show its power, defined as the capacity to prevail its will in face of others. The political phenomena are power phenomena.

For the European Union and its member states as well as for the entire politics, the power is not just a simple aesthetic choice. It is about the existence and the essence of Europe. "To be or not to be". Still, it has to escape from the incapacitating ideologies in order to return to the being. The tragedy of History and the geopolitical dramas impose a certain lucidity to those who pretend to assume mandates and responsibilities. The acceleration of demographic and ecological issues, the geo-energetic struggle and the proliferation of mass destruction technologies as well as the territorial and identity clashes leave the fear of a possible convergence of catastrophes<sup>31</sup>. The chaos sciences teach us about the sensitivity of complex systems to the fines perturbations, susceptible to degenerate into systemic risks.

Theoreticians of the modern state stress the state of nature and we have to "think about the unthinkable": pandemics, climate catastrophes in chain, global and asymmetric wars. Although confronted with the threat of a hyper Chaos<sup>32</sup>, Europeans cannot insure by themselves a defence for a Europe wanted by some with no borders. NATO remains the only one able to carry this task because the peoples and nations of Europe want it this way. After centuries of hegemonic fights among the Ancient World states, the primacy of the New World settles the question of power in Europe, the United States playing the role of a pendulum. Using and abusing of the soft power rhetoric, the Europeanism is satisfied and the security substitutes the military.

Nevertheless the new age commands an epistemological rupture. Tear away from the consoling dialectics, rearm Europe, reinforce the pan-occidental geopolitical solidarity, by calling the spiritual means. The "challenge and response" conditions the permanence of a civilisation, the moral of politics consisting in accomplishing its mission. Here and now.

<sup>30</sup> Referring to the French minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>31</sup> In his *Introduction au siècle des menaces*, Jacques Blamont wrote : « Les conflits ne peuvent que s'envenimer. La synergie des trois fléaux, les guerres, les épidémies et les désastres naturels, risque d'engendrer une Singularité qui ne serait pas le triomphe de la super-intelligence, mais constituerait au contraire le coup d'arrêt donné par la biosphère à son bourreau. (...) L'humanité fonctionne aujourd'hui en boucle ouverte, ce qui dans tout système conduit à une divergence » (Odile Jacob, Paris, 2004, p. 533).

<sup>32</sup> Etymological, « chaos » means «gaping depths».



## Contrepoint

General Bertrand de LA PRESLE

Because the Thomas More Institute wants to be a place for open debate, because all ideas enrich through stimulation, confrontation with other ideas, we inaugurate today our **Contrepoints**. These short pages give the occasion for a skilled personality to criticize in a free personal manner the analysis presented in Thomas More's publications.

**By Bertrand de La PRESLE, former commandant of the UNPROFOR in ex-Yugoslavia, former gouverneur of the Invalides (Paris), Administrator of the Office National des Anciens Combattants (France), Vice-chairman of Géostratégies 2000.**

I was invited to express my opinion over the stimulating contribution of Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, entitled- in a provoking manner- Is NATO the future of Europe?. I must admit that I share most of the ideas presented in this article, so, evidently, I am not going to comment over the things that I agree with. I am going to resume myself to reveal some of my personal observations. Sometimes these are the comments of a general officer whose final years of career were marked by a limited and tensed relations with the 1994-1996 civil and military NATO high-authorities but also the comments of a French citizen interested in the defence and common security issues like the future of Europe.

**1** My first observation lies in the wish that the new NATO, of which assumption is described in a positive manner by Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, finds a new balance, in the modern geostrategic landscape that deprives it of the designated, predictable and symmetric enemy that constituted its reasons to be original. While I ordered the military of the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (FORPRONU), under the political authority of a Japanese diplomat who was the representative of the UN General Secretary on the field. I have in fact lived the difficult pressures to which my NATO colleagues submitted me in order to intervene military and in force against the Serb separatists of Bosnia, in a very complex framework, with a desire of showing in a spectacular, ostentatious manner their operational efficacy – in an era of an existential crisis – and with no tendency to understand the reasons that alimanted my reluctances. I had done them the biggest wrong by admitting that I commanded an operation of the UN where NATO was an useful support....and

not the contrary. I think about a NATO deficit in its objectives.

**2** I find it very important that the new NATO transformed and adequately equipped starts to value its political and civil dimension, in the sense that its military purpose, traditionally predominant, will not be the final scope of the organization, but also one of the instruments used in a project where the main scope will be to create civil structures of multiple natures. In my ex-Yugoslavia commandment, I appreciated my situation as a general officer subordinated to a political authority present on the field on a daily basis, concerned to light up the directives given to my subordinates by a political vision of their probable consequences regarding the strategic project of our common peace mission and the simultaneous missions conducted by my colleagues in charge of the Civil Affairs. My part seemed clear in its spirit, and in its execution. It was a matter of obtaining for the civil persons in charge of the operation, a truce in our area of action, sufficient for the negotiations to take place between the parties concerned, negotiations conducted by UN personalities in charge with diplomatic economical, juridical and administrative aspects of the peace plans.

**3** The birth of such a state of mind requires a significant evolution in the military culture as well as in the training of the American officers that occupy NATO's supreme commandment offices. As I observed, in November 1995 in Dayton, with a little jealousy but also with a certain malaise the absolute influence of the American military over the political authorities engaged in the elaboration of Agreements that had to lead to a military operation of NATO in



Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not even a line about the civilians or the military participating to the mission without the downhill explicit of the military Counselor of the American ambassador Holbrooke who conducted the negotiations and surrounded itself daily with the opinions of American generals from Washington, Brussels and Naples. The priority objective was to transform the involvement of NATO in Bosnia into a spectacular demonstration of force of the organisation, very desirous to be a participant to this European crisis in the dawn of the fiftieth anniversary of the Washington treaty... In this context, NATO authorities were more than reticent to the idea that military forces would be diverted of their fight mission to the profit of the Political Representative of the International Community in charge with the civilian shutters participating to the peace agreements. It will be necessary that these American generals of the New NATO admit their daily puppets role in fulfilling middle and long term objectives watched over by civilian actors who were trusted with the military regulation of the crisis.

**4** During December 1995 and throughout the year 1996, I remained in Sarajevo as a military counsellor for Carl Bildt, who accepted the responsibility of Civil representative in charge with the implementation of Dayton Agreements; my job description consisted in convincing little by little NATO authorities that military and civil are tied together and that the Intervention Force, under an American general would not fill his role, at least in the matter of competing for the implementation of a peace plan in Bosnia. This measure was necessary due to the way the commandment system was built, according to Dayton at the end of delicate negotiations between Europeans and Americans. Applying this bicephalous system, the American Commandant of NATO Military Force (IFOR) was subordinated not to the mission chef who was Carl Bildt, but to the etat major of NATO Brussels and secondly to Washington, while Bildt represented the UN in New York. This division, that I thought to be very unhealthy, continued in Bosnia-Herzegovina until an European commandment substituted the NATO one by applying the Berlin agreements plus (+ ALTHEA operation). It seems to me absolutely necessary that the person in charge with the

whole military operation has a clear and updated vision of the followed political objectives for adapting each moment its manoeuvres to the service of his political authority. It is more important than it is admitted that the notion of military victory makes sense only within the peace plan. At the single question of that NATO American general who wanted to surpass his manoeuvre after his political authorities clearly replied: "Who should I kill?", I find it more important to replace the question with "Who should I save?"

**5** Returning therefore to certain positions developed by Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier in its paper, I would like to assert my opinion as a general officer that the Hard power makes sense only in the company of Soft power, even though it remains evidently that Soft Power can bring to suicidal attempts if it does not have Hard power to the disposal of its ambitions. In the actual state, my hope is that the profound evolution that NATO is going through, would take into account the better understood truth according to which the civilians participating to an operation are the ones that construct little by little the peace, under the protection of the military to whom the real victory would be, when time comes, its discreet withdrawal.

**6** It seems to me that the rejection of the Constitutional treaty by France and then by the Netherlands is only an episode in the long history of the European construction during the last half of century. This episode is full of teachings, we need an active learning in order to make our citizens understand the absolute necessity to develop an European dimension to assure our future by respecting our identity, ideals and values. The stop blast due to different causes, was very serious. It does not condemn the progressive emergence of an Europe of Security and Defence, and it must not incite us to renounce to the only solution that the future of Europe is, NATO. On the contrary, we have to better appreciate the progressive steps of this process.

**7** Despite its concern for the profound transformations destined to adapted it to the new world, NATO remains a powerful tool of



defence, indispensable for our protection against all high-intensity military aggressions. This new world appears to me marked by a real continuum between the notions of defence and security. Facing this continuum, Europe knew how to create devices that NATO still lacks, not from the point of view of resources but culturally speaking; I am thinking for example to the European Police Force, or to other different agencies of the civil global objective 2008, decided by the European Council in June 2004. The new reality of this *continuum* convinces us to act as soon as possible for reestablishing the weak security, so that the situation does not degenerate into extremes that would raise the real defence tools. In this spirit, the use of French military force in times of peace, according to the Internal minister of Police, seem a well-thought disposal. In the same order of ideas, ARTEMIS operation, conducted by the European Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the summer of 2003, brought a modest but significant success in the European desire to progress in conducting interventions under its own authority at the explicit request of the United Nations. To a different level, it is clear that the efficient assistance in the potential conflict zones can constitute investments in the future of peace, having the same effect as an extremely expensive military tool.

**8** In this spirit, the gap between the united States and the European armies of NATO in matters of the budget, the military and technology is effectively breathtaking. But would it be a naïve suggestion to imagine that this gap could be surpassed by a more cooperative attitude of the quickest and of the strongest to the profit of his allies in order to give more coherence and interoperability? It is true that the ambitious and unilateral definition of standards and interoperability norms represents a powerful instrument of economical domination.

**9** What to think of a NATO that becomes little by little the future of an Europe with no military coverage, while the most powerful partner of the Alliance has refused, after the dramatic terrorist attacks of 9/11, the assistance of its allies that for the first time in the history of the Organisation decided to invoke the fifth

article of the Washington treaty related to the mutual defence, declaring in this manner that the mission is the one determining the coalition? Do we need to think that the diplomatic action of the European troika concerning the Iranian nuclear power can be a failure? Is it necessary to consider that the coalition operations in Iraq under American commandment are a success that can be reproduced to its Iranian neighbour? Can we hope that the diplomatic actions of the West and Russia, with no objection from the part of China and with the support of NATO, resolve in an acceptable matter this delicate subject? Regarding the concept of "*haltère*" developed by Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, is it necessary that European pillar must resemble in nature the American military power in order to have a balance? A kilo of feathers cannot balance a kilo of lead?

**10** All in all, I am one of those who think that Europe must evolve to a federal form, the only one capable to allow it to play on the main stage the role of an equilibrate actor, next to transatlantic allies but also South-Americans, Indians or Asians. In order to exist, this Europe must find its common values, covering not only an economic or financial dimension, but mainly a social, juridical, and even an ethical one. To encourage this process, Europe will need an ambitious military instrument accurately sized capable to clearly analyse the risks, menaces but also the best military and civil ways to deal with them. Such an event cannot be done against the public opinions. It cannot be achieved in the rhythms of virtuous incantations. All and more could accelerate its emergence by contributing in an active way to the acknowledgement by the European voters of the absolute necessity of a true Union in order to persevere in our identity and values.

I would like to conclude by doing a modest suggestion: the launch as soon as possible, in a process associating all the Europe countries of today, ready to be involved in such a structured permanent cooperation, of a "White Book on the Security and the European Defences", opened to a horizon surpassing widely the Global objective of 2005 and the one of 2010 that completes it.



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