Moscow and Pyongyang’s Alliance and Maneuvers on the Eurasian Stage · Let Us Stop Being in Denial

November 3, 2024 • Analysis •

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When Vladimir Putin welcomed Kim Jong-un to the Russian Far East from September 13 to 15, 2023, and the North Korean leader visited the Vostochny cosmodrome, a number of commentators said these were futile maneuvers. However, the delivery of North Korean munitions enabled Russia to make up for the shortcomings of its military-industrial apparatus, and this is still the case today. The following year, the master of the Kremlin visited North Korea to sign a defense pact (June 19, 2024). Little reaction in the West. Now, South Korean intelligence tells us that Pyongyang is committing forces to the Ukrainian front. In the light of the facts, the disdain shown for Russia’s actions has given rise to a serious misunderstanding.

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In the first place, it is important to recall the diplomatic failure of North Korea’s transformation into a fearsome nuclear and ballistic power, a failure that reveals the strategic errors and geopolitical illusions of the West, rooted in a false vision of history’s future (the arrow of time toward the better). Experts from the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) revealed in 1992 the existence of the clandestine nuclear program of the Pyongyang regime, whose historical connections with Pakistan and Iran were subsequently revealed (see in particular the nefarious network of Abdul Qadeer Khan). In the two decades that followed, the appeasement diplomacy that won the near-unanimous support of the “international community” proved powerless to stem this now open threat. For the record, the Clinton Administration gave in to blackmail and negotiated an agreement under which Pyongyang would freeze plutonium production, under IAEA supervision, in return for substantial compensation (1994). The USA agreed to lift the existing embargo and to deliver hundreds of thousands of tons of oil to North Korea every year. An international consortium was to supply North Korea with two civilian nuclear power plants, mainly financed by Japan and South Korea. In truth, the USA and its allies were convinced at the time that the North Korean regime, like its founder, was dying (1). The main thing then was to gain time and prepare for the reunification of the Korean peninsula, which was written into the philosophy of history.

The failure of the nuclear counter-proliferation policy

The denuclearization process soon showed its limits, with Pyongyang conducting a clandestine uranium enrichment program. This forced march toward military nuclear power provoked a famine that is said to have caused at least a million deaths. On August 31, 1998, Pyongyang tested a ballistic missile (the Taepodong I) over the Japanese archipelago, a test which caused widespread concern. Three years later, the attacks of September 11, 2001 shook up perceptions of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On January 29, 2002, George W. Bush identified the North Korean regime as a member of the “Axis of Evil” (an expression for which he has not been forgiven). Washington soon deemed the 1994 agreement “null and void,” as the North Korean side had failed to meet its obligations. In response, on January 11, 2003, Pyongyang withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1985, and accelerated its march toward the war atom. Under the patronage of Beijing, North Korea’s protector, a series of multilateral negotiations began (the Six-Party Talks group was set up in 2003), but the exercise soon stalled (2). Since then, Pyongyang has forged ahead, with no resistance other than the force of circumstances. Donald Trump’s lamentable performance comes to mind. He was apparently convinced that Pyongyang could sacrifice its ballistic-nuclear device on the altar of hotel and tourism development. The American president will have put on a “show” for Kim Jong-un (see the June 30, 2019 meeting).

After North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, five more followed. Now, hardly a month goes by without the Pyongyang regime launching missiles, ballistic or otherwise, into the air and waters of Japan or South Korea. On September 8, 2023, the local tyrant unveiled a ballistic missile submarine, inaugurating a new threshold. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of experts and observers casting doubt on the reality of North Korea’s military capabilities, the height of intelligence consisting in putting everything into perspective. As long ago as 2006, the reality of North Korea’s first nuclear test was called into question. Then came its ballistic tests. Today, we pretend to take North Korea’s recent space failures as a sign of its notorious incapacity, while realizing that Russia could provide decisive assistance and enable North Korea’s nuclear forces to cross new thresholds, with submarines eventually capable of launching intercontinental missiles. “We are not there yet,” specialists will say, but should we refrain from speculation and anticipation? Let us not forget that the Pyongyang regime was not supposed to have nuclear weapons.

The closeness of ties between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang is still a matter of some doubt. We will not come back to the Sino-Russian alliance, which is often said not to exist, on the pretext that it is not eternal and unconditional (3). Looking back over the past three decades, we have been told that Moscow and Beijing were hostile to North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. The United States and its allies could therefore count on the support of these two capitals to bring North Korea to heel. Along the way, such a policy would transform the People’s Republic of China and Russia into “stakeholders,” i.e. responsible shareholders in the international system, for the greater good of world peace and prosperity. Sino-Russian leaders are “pragmatists,” it was explained. Until recently, the pragmatism of neo-Maoist Xi Jinping was being called upon to contain the hubris of Vladimir Putin, who himself was deemed pragmatic until February 24, 2022. Perhaps we should ask ourselves about the meaning of the words we use and abuse. Are Western pragmatists “useful idiots”?

The former USSR and Russia, an ally and protector of the North Korean regime

In any case, the reality of the situation will have thwarted this optimistic anticipation of North Korea’s future, an anticipation marked by the stamp of economic reductionism: tyrants and despots would be comparable to businessmen seeking to maximize their gains on an economic market. In fact, the Chinese and Russians are driven first and foremost by their hostility to the United States and the West, whose hegemony they want to break. Their aim is to use North Korea as a force for destroying Western alliances in the Far East. While the Chinese and Russians have in the past passed a number of resolutions condemning Pyongyang’s proliferation policy and its disrespect for the NPT, they have constantly sought to undermine the substance of international sanctions, when they have not helped to circumvent embargo measures. Opened in 2003, the six-party negotiations in which they took part — alongside the USA, South Korea and Japan — were in vain. Since 2017, Beijing and Moscow have no longer condemned the actions of their North Korean ally. In the current geopolitical climate – the war in Ukraine and growing tensions in the Old World, from Europe to the Taiwan Strait and all the way to the Sea of Japan — the closer ties between Moscow and Pyongyang are no laughing matter. Let us not forget the close, genealogical link between the former USSR and Russia on the one hand and the North Korean regime on the other hand. The latter’s territorial base is the Soviet occupation zone in the north of the Korean peninsula, acquired in 1945, and it was Stalin’s will that presided over the formation of North Korea. With the support of the USSR and Maoist China, this satellite unleashed the bloody Korean War (1950-1953), which had been suspended since the Panmunjom Armistice (July 27, 1953). In 1958, Moscow delivered to Pyongyang the turnkey Yongbyon laboratory, the starting point of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Even then, the two countries were bound by a bilateral treaty, signed in 1961, which included a mutual assistance clause. Over time, however, this alliance loosened against a backdrop of discord and hostility between Beijing and Moscow, forcing the small North Korean state to navigate between the Soviet and Chinese giants. Moreover, the Soviet leadership, who had their fingers burnt by the Cuban crisis (October 1962), now wanted to lock down access to nuclear weapons (Washington and Moscow were behind the NPT, signed in 1968), so Pyongyang turned to Pakistan, engaged in a policy of clandestine proliferation. However, the USSR retained enough influence to convince Pyongyang to join the NPT (1985). Ties weakened after the break-up of the USSR. Under Boris Yeltsin, post-Soviet Russia had other priorities, even if its diplomacy sketched out so-called anti-hegemonic coalitions (the “Primakov diplomacy”). For a time, the quest for solvent markets, not only to preserve the arms industry but also for personal enrichment, took precedence over historical alliances. From this angle, South Korea’s industrial development and economic prosperity were more attractive.

Having reached the pinnacle of power, Putin first claimed to be a third-party peacemaker between the two Koreas, and thus a diplomatic partner of the United States in managing the rampant international crisis caused by North Korea’s ballistic and nuclear programs. On February 9, 2000, Moscow signed a treaty of friendship, good-neighborliness and cooperation with Pyongyang, without the automatic military assistance clause of the past, and Putin became the first Russian head of state to visit North Korea (July 2000). At the same time, he sought to develop economic and trade relations with South Korea. The history of relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, Russian geography and diplomatic activism meant that Moscow became a stakeholder in the Six-Party Talks opened in 2003. However, its own weight and influence were insufficient to make a difference. Above all, the ins and outs of Russia’s revisionist policy ruled out the possibility of Russia making a bona fide contribution to resolving the crisis by suppressing Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. As mentioned, ambiguity and complacency prevailed.

The infernal Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang trio

Developments in the Ukrainian war and the revelation of Russia’s military shortcomings played a part in tightening the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance. From 2023, the terms of trade were obvious: stocks of North Korean shells, ammunition and missiles (4) (Soviet-made), in exchange for transfers of Russian ballistic and space technologies (North Korea wanted to put a military intelligence satellite into orbit), in addition to the development of trade links. Pyongyang could also ensure the supply of North Korean workers, or to be more precise, state serfs, to make up for Russia’s demographic shortfall, exacerbated by military mobilization. In addition, North Korean deliveries to Russia could conceal transfers of Chinese components and equipment, thus enabling Beijing to avoid Western sanctions on its exports; until now, the trade war with the United States, the deterioration of Sino-European relations and the slowdown of the Chinese economy have forced Beijing to keep up appearances. Influential figures in Moscow recommend using nuclear proliferation as an instrument to serve Russian strategic and geopolitical interests; the Russian ideologist and political scientist Sergei Karaganov is very clear on this point (5). 

On the other hand, the dispatch of North Korean troops to the Ukrainian front was not anticipated. The information was communicated on October 18 by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS). According to the NIS, 1,500 North Korean soldiers have been sent to military bases in the Russian Far East, in Vladivostok, Ussuriysk, Khabarovsk and Blagovechtchensk (another 10,000 soldiers are expected to follow). After a period of training, they will be deployed on the Ukrainian front, in Donbas and in the Russian region of Kursk, partially occupied by Ukrainian forces since last summer. Already, North Korean elements are said to be present on Ukrainian soil, in the part of Donbas taken by the Russians, and six of them were killed near Donetsk on October 6 (6). In the United States, as in Europe, fervent optimists want to believe that this will not affect the course of the war; we should almost rejoice at this information, as it would testify to the degree of Russia’s exhaustion, both in human and material terms. Contrary to such an analysis, North Korea’s direct involvement should be seen as a sign of a new escalation by Vladimir Putin, who refuses to restrain from anything and is waging the war with a long-term perspective, not hesitating to tap into the North Korean reservoir. Can we believe in Russia’s limited territorial ambitions and in future peace negotiations? In the long term, is is not the aim to reduce Europe to a small cape of Asia?

Beyond that, a Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang geostrategic triangle is taking shape on the Eurasian stage, to which we must add the Islamic Iranian regime and its followers (Hezbollah, Hamas, Pan-Shia and Houthi militias), on its southern “boulevard” (the Middle East, between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean). From Russia’s point of view, growing tensions in the Far East will weaken the United States, victim of a phenomenon of strategic overstretch, with positive effects for Russia in the Ukrainian theater. For China, the strain on American alliances in the region will modify the correlation of forces in the Taiwan Strait and in the South and East China Seas, those “Asian Mediterraneans” that Xi Jinping wants to transform into inland seas (see the “land reclamation” of the South China Sea). If there was any doubt, the repeated provocations by China’s armed forces against the Philippines, and the ever-intensifying military manoeuvres around Taiwan, demonstrate the determination to test American resolve and get a move on (7). In this Eurasian “Great Game”, Pyongyang is strengthening its alliances and “comparative advantages.” If the opportunity arises, Kim Jong-un may well want to reunify the Korean peninsula by force. In the meantime, the Islamic regime in Iran, within a few months, has taken the initiative with a double strike on Israeli territory (8), but some optimists say they hope Moscow and Beijing will calm things down as, obviously, they would have no interest in a deterioration of the situation (9). (dream on).

To conclude

In short, as politicians and observers in Kyiv point out, the West has managed the escalation so well that we now find ourselves with North Korean soldiers on the Ukrainian front, while the Chinese and Iranians have continued to increase their multi-faceted support for Russia, not without Russian counterparties in the Middle East, where the war is now open, and in the Far East, where tensions are mounting. From one end of Eurasia to the other, the United States in particular, and its allies to a lesser extent, are overstretched, at the risk of strategic overextension. While a regional explosion is threatening the southern “boulevard” of this Eurasian landmass, home to most of the world’s population and production capacities, the Russian army is stepping up its pressure on Ukraine, methodically destroying its energy infrastructures and advancing into Donbas.

It may not yet be a world war, but we are immersed in a world at war, with a possible convergence of dramatic lines on the horizon. Faced with this daunting prospect, most Western governments are procrastinating, many of their strategists are pretending to encapsulate reality in behavioral models derived from game theory; opposition forces, when they are not making a mental pact with the threat, are withdrawing from the world of life to focus on domestic demands, in accordance with the law of “more and more” that governs social democracies (“Every man for himself, the state for all”). In short, post-modern Western societies are no longer politically structured and organized around irreducible external threats. So we need to prepare for the worst, and remember the Sphinx’s challenge to Oedipus: “Decipher me or I will devour you.”

Notes •

(1) Kim Il-sung died on July 8, 1994, and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-il, inaugurating a “red dynasty.” Kim Jong-un took over in 2011.

(2) At the same time, Washington is attacking the illegal financial activities of the North Korean regime, accusing Macao’s Banco Delta Asia of laundering large sums on behalf of Pyongyang. As a result, $24m (€18m) in North Korean accounts held with this financial entity have been frozen.

(3) See Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “The Sino-Russian Axis and its Extensions: The Challenge of Naming Reality”, Desk Russie, October 10, 2024, available here.

(4) Some have expressed doubts about the military value of these supplies and equipment, but the Ukrainian military now claims that the mass effect provided to the Russian army on the battlefield poses real tactical problems. North Korea has supplied its Russian ally with three million artillery shells and several dozen ballistic missiles.

(5) See “Why not send a missile to the Reichstag” (interview with Sergei Karaganov), Le Grand Continent, October 12, 2024. Other texts by this organic intellectual of Putinism are available, including the so-called “Karaganov doctrine,” an expression of the Kremlin’s worldview and a set of foreign policy precepts.

(6) According to Ukrainian intelligence, these North Korean soldiers, numbering between 1,500 and 3,000 men, make up a “Buryat battalion,” a way of concealing their presence. We have moved beyond that now, and North Korean generals are even reported to have been dispatched.

(7) See Pierre-Antoine Donnet, “A calculated risk? China steps up military pressure against Taiwan”, Asianyst, October 18, 2024.

(8) The Iranian army launched nearly 200 drones, a hundred surface-to-surface missiles and three dozen cruise missiles on April 13 and 14, 2024 (Tehran’s aides took part in the operation), followed by 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Such an initiative, formally ruled out by many experts until it was taken, is now presented as having little military significance (“It’s only symbolic”), so as to delegitimize the Israeli response to come.

(9) The Biden Administration’s hope that Moscow will limit its military-technical aid to the Iranian regime and reason with it is one of the reasons behind its refusal to give Kyiv the means to strike deeper into Russian territory